Twenty-two months after its declaration of independence, Kosovo faces this week a legal decision that could make or break its very existence. On Tuesday 1 December, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Hague began deliberations that will eventually rule on the legality of Kosovo’s declaration of independence; and so, by the time it comes to celebrate the two year anniversary of that declaration, Kosovo might very well have secured through peaceful means a recognition of its own legitimacy. In a region that has become a byword for ethnic splintering and protracted intrastate conflict, this is a miraculous step forward, and one for which the international community can claim rare credit.

Admittedly, the process has not been smooth. Following the declaration of independence, there were large-scale demonstrations in Belgrade and scuffles between Serbs and Albanians, and Serbian politicians of all stripes have vowed to oppose an independent Kosovo. What didn’t happen, however, is a repeat of the conflicts of the 1990s: Kosovo stands a chance, therefore, of becoming only the second former-Yugoslav entity after Macedonia to gain independence peacefully, something staggering to imagine given the scope of its territorial and ethnic disputes with Serbia.

The first time around, in 1991, those states that chose to secede from the Serbian-controlled Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia endured protracted wars of independence for their troubles. Not even Slovenia was spared fighting, even though it had no territorial disagreements with other Yugoslav republics and was ethnically homogeneous, and thus had no minorities wishing to remain in Yugoslavia. Croatia and Bosnia, who had both territorial disputes and secessionist minorities, were subjected to bitter conflict for three years. Hundreds of thousands died; countless more fled or were driven from their homes, many of whom have still not returned.

The international community, sadly, played a key role in enabling this bloodshed. Mired in concerns first about whether this was a European problem or an American one, and then over quite what the common European line should be, the supposed mediators of the Yugoslav crisis could not agree on the most trivial of matters, let alone on whether or not to afford the new republics diplomatic recognition. Germany pushed hard for early recognition, the rest of Europe disagreed; while Europe fiddled, Bosnia and Croatia burned. Had the European Community recognised the new states and their borders immediately, and reinforced that support with the threat of military force, the region could perhaps have been spared conflict, and a focus could have been placed on a peaceful solution to the legitimate grievances of the Croats in Bosnia and the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia.

Kosovo found itself in 2008, then, in a similar situation to that of Croatia and Bosnia in 1991: as a constituent part of a Serb-dominated state, it wished to organise itself along ethnic lines in order to better pursue self-determination for its people. Kosovo’s central belt, with its disparate Serb enclaves and mixed population, was demographically not substantially different from the Drina Valley in Bosnia where the massacres at Srebrenica and Višegrad took place. Its Serb population lived as the Bosniaks had in the Drina Valley, in disparate pockets and enclaves, surrounded by Kosovar Albanians as the Drina Valley Bosniaks were surrounded by Serbs. When Kosovo declared independence, then, one might have been forgiven for predicting a repeat of the bloodshed of 1992–1995 in Bosnia and Croatia, or of the 1998–1999 Kosovo War. If this was to be avoided, Kosovo needed the international community not to repeat the mistake of 1991: would they have the diplomatic fortitude to recognise Kosovo immediately, and stave off any potential conflict?

In the end, they did. Within 24 hours of declaring independence, Kosovo found itself with the absolutely essential recognition of the United States, France, and the UK, three of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. Within a week, 17 countries had recognised Kosovo; to date, 63 countries have done so. A clear message was sent to Serbia: military action was out of the question. The issue was by no means settled, but early recognition ensured that the future of Kosovo would be determined at the negotiating table and in the international courts, not on the battlefield. The international community had achieved that rarest of things in their dealings with the former Yugoslavia: success. Tentative, diffident success; but success regardless.